A defining characteristic of most battles is confusion, with even commanders uncertain of the progress of their forces. This was particularly true of Prokhorovka, where a clash between two great tank armies took place in a confined space close to a rail junction and the River Psel – one which few tank commanders would have chosen – and with the fighting enveloped in clouds of dust. A remarkable new history of the largest tank battle of the Second World War and key moment in the 1943 Kursk campaign. This is fundamental reading for anyone wanting to understand operations on the Eastern Front, it will become a template for undertaking battlefield history. Perhaps surprisingly in a book full of accounts of tank clashes and armies surging forwards, the most readable chapter here is one that looks at the German archival records, right down to the intricacies of divisional paperwork and weekly inventories. Indeed, this book does an excellent service in showing why it is in the archives, not in television studios, that truly good historians spend most of their time. A remarkable new history of th Leibstandarte had advanced the most deeply towards Prokhorovka and was situated in the centre of the German position. [88] A railway line, with a 30-feet high railbed, divided Leibstandarte 's area into north and south. The bulk of the division was positioned to the north of the rail line, including the division's 1st SS-Panzer Regiment and 2nd SS-Panzergrenadier Regiment, as well as its reconnaissance, artillery and command units. [88] [89] To the south of the rail line was Leibstandarte 's 1st SS-Panzergrenadier Regiment, along with the division's 1st SS- Panzerjäger Battalion. [88] [89] Das Reich was positioned to the south of Leibstandarte, and it protected the southern flank of the II SS-Panzer Corps. [90] Totenkopf was positioned to the northwest of Leibstandarte. Totenkopf 's 3rd SS-Panzer Regiment had largely crossed over the Psel in preparation for the assault. Leibstandarte placed its lightly armed 1st SS-Panzer Reconnaissance Battalion in the 5-kilometre (3.1mi) gap between it and Totenkopf to provide some flank protection. [91] [88] [89] The unit was, later on 12 July, buttressed by the division's four remaining Tigers, commanded by SS-Untersturmführer Michael Wittmann. [92] Disposition of Soviet forces [ edit ]

Prokhorovka: the greatest tank battle in history? | The Past

Stein, Marcel; Fairbank, Gwyneth (2007). Field Marshal von Manstein: The Janus Head. Solihull, UK: Helion & Company. ISBN 978-1-906033-02-6.Archival data of the II SS-Panzer Corps shows that the corps had 294 operable tanks and assault guns on the evening of 11 July, and 251 on the evening of 13 July. [77] Allowing for the possibility that some repaired tanks were returned to service on 13 July, these numbers indicate that at least 43 tanks and assault guns became inoperable during this period, which includes all ten Tigers belonging to Totenkopf and one belonging to Leibstandarte. [191] An estimated total of 60–80 tanks and assault guns of the II SS-Panzer Corps were damaged or destroyed in combat on 12 July. [192] [193] By the end of 16 July, the II SS-Panzer Corps had 292 serviceable tanks and assault guns, almost the same number it had at the beginning of the battle on 12 July. [194] On 12 July, Schlachtgeschwader 1 of the 8th Air Corps reported 11 aircraft damaged, all by Soviet anti-aircraft artillery, of which 6 were total write-offs. [6] Soviet [ edit ] Destroyed Soviet T-34, 1943 It was certainly one of the greatest tank battles of the war, but the claim that it was the greatest has been challenged by American historian David Glantz and Russian historian Valeriy Zamulin. Both have argued that the Battle of Brody, in June 1941, involved more tanks, and was of greater importance, putting an end to Hitler’s hopes of defeating the Soviet Union in a short war. Glantz, David M.; Orenstein, Harold S. (1999). The Battle for Kursk 1943: The Soviet General Staff Study. London: Taylor & Francis (Frank Cass). ISBN 0-7146-4933-3. – This report, commissioned by the Soviet General Staff in 1944, was designed to educate the Red Army on how to conduct war operations. It was classified secret until its declassification in 1964, and was later edited and translated to English by Orenstein and Glantz. Its original title was Collection of Materials for the Study of War Experience, No. 11 (Russian: Сборник материалов по изучению опыта войны № 11, romanized: Sbornik materialov po izucheniyu opyta voyny № 11). The present academic consensus has it that the cream of Hitler’s armoured formations, the thuggish paramilitary SS Panzer Divisions, were smashed in this battle, losing hundreds of tanks, and never recovering their former capabilities. In reality, diligent archival research reveals that only 16 tanks from the SS formations were lost. In fact, by the end of the Kursk fighting, these units had more tanks than they started with. The battle which developed and then concluded on June 30 was a confusing morass that swallowed 2,648 Soviet tanks out of a total force of 5,000 versus some 1,000 German tanks. It’s unclear how many tanks of the 1st Panzer Group were destroyed in the battle, but the force did lose 100 of its tanks during the first two weeks of the war.

The Panzers of Prokhorovka by Ben Wheatley | Waterstones

Whether the failure of Citadel was, as some historians have claimed, a turning-point in the war is also questionable, for the German position, not just on the Eastern Front, but in the war as a whole, was already parlous. Though Valeriy Zamulin, a Russian military historian and former curator of Prokhorovka, Museum, suggests a more modest figure for German losses, he still concludes that they lost as many as 80 tanks – against some 400 Russian losses. Losses in dispute Comparing Soviet and German archives, the total number of tanks and other heavy armoured fighting vehicles such as assault guns and self-propelled guns deployed by the 5th Guards Tank Army and the II SS-Panzer Corps around Prokhorovka during the battle numbered only about 910. [104] The II SS-Panzer Corps never had the number of tanks and assault guns attributed to it by Soviet estimates at any point during Operation Citadel, [129] not even at the start when it fielded only 494. [209] Even if the definition of the battle was broadened to include the III Panzer Corps and the portion of the 5th Guards Tank Army that faced it, the total number of tanks and other heavy armoured fighting vehicles comes out at a maximum of 1,299. [104] In contrast, for example, the Battle of Brody during Operation Barbarossa involved over 2,000 tanks, up to 6,000 tanks over the duration of the battle, engaged in combat over a 70-kilometre (43mi) front. [210] [211] Nonetheless, the Battle of Prokhorovka is still regarded as one of the largest tank battles in military history. Pinkus, Oscar (2005). The War Aims and Strategies of Adolf Hitler. Jefferson, N.C: McFarland. ISBN 978-0-7864-2054-4.

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Wheatley reveals the truth about the Battle of Prokhorovka in July 1943, “the greatest armoured clash in history”: it was indeed an operational victory for the Soviets, but it came at a huge cost and – contrary to popular belief – utterly failed to destroy Hitler's elite panzer force. As the Soviet tanks reached the ditch, which was 4.5m deep, many fell over and into it, while others turned aside to cross the bridge constructed by the Germans for their panzers, thereby exposing their flanks and becoming easy targets. Karl-Heinz Frieser, Germany and the Second World War, Volume VIII, The Eastern Front 1943-1944 (2017).